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NOTE
Conflicting Requirements of Notice:
The Incorporation of Rule 9(b) into the False
Claims Act’s First-to-File Bar
Brian D. Howe*
Intended to prevent fraud against the government, the False Claims Act
(“FCA”) contains a qui tam provision allowing private individuals, known as
relators, to bring suits on behalf of the government and receive a portion of the
damages. At the heart of the qui tam provision lies the first-to-file bar, which
provides that, once a first relator has filed a complaint, subsequent relators are
prohibited from coming forward with complaints based on the facts underlying the first relator’s pending action. A circuit split has recently emerged regarding the incorporation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened
pleading standard into the FCA’s first-to-file rule. Neither the circuit court
decisions nor the relevant scholarship on this issue, however, has provided a
comprehensive explanation as to why the government’s notice requirements
should differ—if indeed they should differ at all—from defendants’ notice
requirements for purposes of the first-to-file bar. This Note aims to fill that
void and argues that, unlike garden-variety civil defendants in an adversarial
context, the government maintains a partnership with the relator and has
sufficient investigatory tools beyond the four corners of the complaint to assess
adequately the merits of the relator’s allegations. Thus, the government does
not require the heightened notice of Rule 9(b) at the first-to-file stage, and
courts should ultimately adopt the approach employed by the First and D.C.
Circuits in affording preclusive effect to first-filed FCA complaints, even if they
are deficient under Rule 9(b).
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Introduction
The False Claims Act (“FCA”)’s origins trace back to the Civil War in
1863.1 With the rebel forces swiftly moving toward Washington, D.C., Union
armies faced dwindling supplies of muskets, horses, and mules due to government contractor profiteering.2 Recognizing the lack of government resources and the potential for private citizens to combat defenseprocurement fraud, President Lincoln signed the FCA into law.3 The FCA
was intended to encourage private individuals to alert the government to
fraud.4 To effectuate this goal, the Act contains a qui tam provision, which
allows private citizens—also known as relators—to bring suits on behalf of
the government and receive a portion of the damages.5
Throughout the FCA’s history, Congress has sought a delicate balance
between two competing policy objectives: encouraging whistleblowers to

1. 131 Cong. Rec. 22,322 (1985) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) (“The main purpose behind the enactment of the False Claims Act of 1863 [was] to encourage individuals to
ferret out fraud against the government . . . .”).
2. James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their
Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 35, 35 (1991).
3. 131 Cong. Rec. 22,322; Helmer & Neff, supra note 2, at 35.
4. 131 Cong. Rec. 22,322.
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). “The name ‘qui tam’ comes from a longer Latin phrase,
‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur,’ which means ‘[w]ho sues on
behalf of the King as well as for himself.’ ” J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English
Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 539, 541 n.3 (2000) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1251 (6th ed. 1990)).
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come forward and alert the government to fraudulent activity and simultaneously discouraging opportunistic plaintiffs from initiating parasitic lawsuits.6 These dual policy goals have come to the forefront in the circuit split
regarding the incorporation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (“Rule
9(b)”)’s heightened pleading standard7 into the FCA’s first-to-file provision,
which prohibits anyone other than the government from intervening or
bringing “a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”8 In opposition to the Sixth Circuit,9 the First Circuit recently joined
the D.C. Circuit in holding that an earlier-filed FCA complaint need not
satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement to provide the government with
sufficient notice of the alleged fraud and to preclude a later-filed
complaint.10
Commentators in favor of eliminating Rule 9(b) from the first-to-file
bar argue that this approach better comports with the FCA’s twin policy
goals of encouraging parties promptly to report fraud and deterring parasitic relators,11 and further that it provides a clear, exception-free application
of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) for courts to follow.12 By contrast, those commentators in favor of grafting Rule 9(b) onto the first-to-file bar claim that including Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement will better serve to “minimize
social loss from false claims” and more effectively use relators as government
6. E.g., United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir.
2013); United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005).
7. Unlike the “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 for typical notice pleading, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the significantly more demanding Rule 9(b) provides that a party alleging
fraud or mistake in its complaint “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be
alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
8. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).
9. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972.
10. Guidant, 718 F.3d at 36; Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.
11. Daniel Long, Comment, Last Call: According First-Filed Qui Tam Complaints Greater
Preclusive Effect Under Batiste’s Narrow Interpretation of the First-to-File Rule, 54 B.C. L. Rev.
E. Supp. 161 (2013), http://www.bclawreview.org/files/2013/04/12_Long.pdf. Discussing the
D.C. Circuit’s holding in Batiste, Long provides a policy analysis and contends that the court’s
approach “is preferable because it better promotes the goals of promptly notifying the government of fraudulent claims and discouraging opportunistic suits.” Id. at 173–74.
12. Joel Deuth, Comment, The False Claims Act’s First-to-File Bar: How the Particularity
Requirement of Civil Procedure Militates Against Combating Fraud, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 795,
796, 798–99 (2013). In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187
(9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit noted that “§ 3730(b)(5)’s plain language does not contain
exceptions” and ruled that “an exception-free, first-to-file bar conforms with the dual purposes of the 1986 amendments: to promote incentives for whistle-blowing insiders and prevent
opportunistic successive plaintiffs.” Drawing from the Ninth Circuit’s “exception-free” principle, Deuth posits that exceptions to the first-to-file bar would create a slippery slope and
further contends that “[c]ourts can consistently apply the first-to-file bar to cases as long as
the rule is exception-free.” Deuth, supra, at 816. Recommending that courts first and foremost
adhere to this exception-free approach, he concludes that complaints that are jurisdictionally
deficient under the first-to-file bar should preclude later-filed complaints but that “complaints
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resources.13 These broad policy arguments, however, fail adequately to address Rule 9(b)’s practical utility in providing notice to the government at
the first-to-file stage.
Critically, neither the circuit court decisions nor the relevant scholarship
on this issue has provided a comprehensive explanation as to why the government’s notice requirements should differ—if indeed they should differ at
all—from defendants’ notice requirements for purposes of the first-to-file
bar. If the government needs the same heightened notice as common law
fraud defendants, Rule 9(b) should be incorporated into the first-to-file bar,
and complaints that are deficient under Rule 9(b) will not preclude laterfiled complaints. But if the government does not need such particularized
notice, Rule 9(b) should not apply to the first-to-file bar, and complaints
that are deficient under Rule 9(b) will accordingly preclude later-filed complaints. This Note resolves the conflict underlying the circuit split by identifying and justifying the difference in FCA notice requirements for the
government at the first-to-file stage and for defendants at the pleading stage.
This Note argues that, when interpreting the FCA’s first-to-file bar,
courts should follow the approach adopted by the First and D.C. Circuits in
affording preclusive effect to first-filed complaints even if they are deficient
under Rule 9(b). Unlike garden-variety civil defendants in an adversarial
context, the government pursues a partnership with the plaintiff and therefore does not require heightened notice in the complaint to shield its reputation or to prepare a defense strategy. Part I addresses the congressional
intent behind 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and analyzes the current circuit split
regarding the incorporation of Rule 9(b) into the FCA’s first-to-file rule.
Part II contrasts the underlying purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and Rule
9(b) and maintains that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, which
primarily protects the defendant, should not apply to the first-to-file bar.
Part III argues that, because the government has sufficient investigatory resources beyond the four corners of the complaint to assess adequately the
merits of the relator’s allegations, complaints need not satisfy Rule 9(b) to
provide the government with notice sufficient to launch an investigation
into the defendant’s alleged conduct.

dismissed on their merits should not preclude later-filed suits, and relators should be given the
opportunity to state a claim with sufficient particularity.” Id. at 820.
13. Ni Qian, Note, Necessary Evils: How to Stop Worrying and Love Qui Tam, 2013
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 594, 624–25. Qian asserts that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
should readjust its resource allocation to refrain from intervening in cases where the opportunity cost of nonintervention is low, especially in cases where the penalty is small and the
government’s intervention will not be material to the relator’s success. Id. at 624. Accordingly,
in such cases, “the DOJ should simply take a backseat and let the relator pursue the case
alone.” Id. Qian further argues that, once the DOJ readjusts its resource allocation and intervenes in fewer cases, the expected value of allowing later-filed cases to proceed increases, and
courts should respond by following the Sixth Circuit’s Walburn decision. Id. This approach
purportedly eliminates undue hostility to relators and allows them to act as private attorneys
general, which in turn conserves the government’s resources. Id. at 624–25.
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I. Congressional Intent Behind 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and the
Current Circuit Split Regarding the Incorporation
of Rule 9(b)
This Part provides an overview of qui tam procedure, the first-to-file
bar, and the conflicting circuit court decisions regarding the inclusion of
Rule 9(b) in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). Section I.A discusses the procedure
followed by relators bringing suit under the FCA and the dual policy interests underlying the qui tam provision. Section I.B details the Sixth Circuit’s
approach of incorporating Rule 9(b) into the first-to-file bar and accordingly rendering first-filed complaints “legally infirm”14 if they are deficient
under Rule 9(b). Finally, Section I.C examines the more recent approach
adopted by the First and D.C. Circuits, which have declined to create an
exception to the first-to-file rule by including Rule 9(b) therein and in turn
have afforded preclusive effect to first-filed complaints that fail to pass Rule
9(b)’s scrutiny.15
A. Competing Policy Interests in the Qui Tam Provision
When a relator brings suit under the FCA, his complaint remains under
seal for at least sixty days, during which time the government decides
whether to intervene in the action before it is served on the defendant.16 If
the government elects to intervene, it bears the primary burden of prosecuting the case, although the relator still has the opportunity to continue as a
party in the action.17 Further, the relator has the potential to receive up to
25% of any monetary damages or settlement of the claim, depending on the
extent of his participation in the case.18 If the government declines to intervene, however, the plaintiff can still prosecute the action himself19 and receive up to 30% of the proceeds.20
The qui tam provision balances the dual policy goals of encouraging
whistleblowers to provide notice of fraudulent activity to the government
and deterring parasitic plaintiffs who have no original information to provide.21 Indeed, the FCA seeks to achieve “the golden mean between adequate
incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information

14. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972.
15. Guidant, 718 F.3d 28; Batiste, 659 F.3d 1204.
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012).
17. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
18. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
19. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
20. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
21. E.g., United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir.
2013); Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005); 132 Cong. Rec.
22,339–40 (1986) (statement of Rep. Berkley Bedell).

564

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 113:559

and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own.”22 This approach is particularly reflected in the FCA’s first-to-file rule, which prohibits anyone other than the
government from intervening or bringing “a related action based on the
facts underlying the pending action.”23 Congress implemented the first-tofile provision as part of the 1986 Amendments Act, which significantly overhauled the FCA.24 Although Congress intended the amendments to facilitate
and encourage additional relators to bring suit under the FCA in light of
increasing fraud against the government,25 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary clarified that the first-to-file rule was drafted to prevent “class actions” and “multiple separate suits based on identical facts and
circumstances.”26
Accordingly, the first-to-file rule tasks federal courts with weeding out
parasitic complaints in which “would-be relators merely feed off a previous
disclosure of fraud.”27 Although courts initially contested “whether facts
needed to be identical or material,”28 a growing dispute has arisen regarding
the incorporation of Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement into the first-tofile rule.29 Rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the First Circuit recently
joined the D.C. Circuit in holding that an earlier-filed FCA complaint “need
not meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) to provide sufficient
notice to the government of the alleged fraud and bar a later-filed complaint.”30 The First Circuit thereby substantially limited the possibility of
additional qui tam actions based on similar facts.
22. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).
24. Harvinder S. Anand, Note, Competing Relators and Competing Objectives Under the
False Claims Act: Barring Subsequent Claims Should Look Beyond the Plain Language of Section
3730(b)(5), 28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 89, 95–96 (1998); see False Claims Amendments Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-562, sec. 3, § 3730, 100 Stat. 3153, 3154–55 (1986).
25. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1–2 (1986). The 1986 Amendments Act further encouraged
whistleblowers to bring suit under the FCA by modernizing jurisdiction and venue provisions,
increasing recoverable damages, raising civil forfeiture and criminal penalties, defining the
mental element required for a successful prosecution, and clarifying the burden of proof in
civil false claims actions. Id. at 2–3.
26. Id. at 24.
27. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005).
28. Deuth, supra note 12, at 796. In interpreting the “facts underlying the same pending
action” language of the first-to-file bar, circuit courts have primarily adopted either the “material” or “essential” facts test. Id. The Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have applied the “same
material facts” test, while the Tenth Circuit has considered the “core fact or general conduct
relied upon in the first qui tam action.” United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.,
Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75–76 (D. Conn. 2005).
29. See United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir.
2013); United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972; see also Deuth, supra note 12, at 804–07; Long, supra note 11, at 162–63;
Qian, supra note 13, at 614–15.
30. Guidant, 718 F.3d at 36; see also Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.
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B. The Sixth Circuit’s “Legally Infirm” Approach
In Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the relator, a former security officer at a government-owned power plant, alleged that Lockheed Martin falsified dosage readings obtained from dosimeters worn by employees to
maintain its accreditation with the Department of Energy and continue receiving funding pursuant to its contract with the federal government.31 Determining that Walburn’s allegations were “encompassed” by the allegations
in an earlier-filed action by Kenneth Brooks,32 the district court dismissed
his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(5).33 The Sixth Circuit, however, ruled that “the Brooks complaint’s failure to comply with Rule 9(b) rendered it legally infirm from its
inception” and therefore incapable of precluding Walburn’s action under the
first-to-file provision.34
Unconvinced by the defendant’s argument that such a holding would
carve out an exception from the “exception-free” first-to-file bar, the court
responded that the Brooks complaint was insufficient to put both the government and the defendant on notice of the underlying fraud.35 Declining to
draw any distinction between the notice requirements for the government in
a qui tam action and those for a defendant in standard civil litigation, the
Sixth Circuit summarily concluded that “[a] complaint that fails to provide
adequate notice to a defendant can hardly be said to have given the government notice of the essential facts of a fraudulent scheme, and therefore
would not enable the government to uncover related frauds.”36 Significantly,
the court failed to provide a developed analysis that would justify grafting
Rule 9(b) onto the government’s notice requirements. Instead, the court
simply posited that the incorporation of Rule 9(b) into the first-to-file bar
would better comport with the policies of the FCA, as it would presumably
31. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 974.
32. United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. Civ. L-00-1088, 2005 WL
841997 (D. Md. Mar. 22, 2005).
33. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 969. The first relator, Kenneth P. Brooks, had initially filed a
qui tam action on April 14, 2000, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland,
similarly alleging that Lockheed Martin had improperly disposed of waste and misrepresented
its compliance with its Department of Energy contract while continuing to receive government
funding. Brooks, 2005 WL 841997, at *1. The United States filed a Notice of Election to Decline
Intervention on January 30, 2003. Id. Concluding that the Brooks complaint failed to provide
particular details as to each of the defendant’s fraudulent claims, the district court dismissed
the complaint pursuant to Rule 9(b). Id. at *2–3. Jeff Walburn, the second relator, filed his
own qui tam action on November 12, 2002. United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 936, 937 (S.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d sub nom. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 431 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 2005). Noting that Brooks’s allegations were “the same as Plaintiff’s but more expansive,” the district court dismissed Walburn’s complaint under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(5) because it “contain[ed] the same material elements of fraud as Brooks’s complaint and . . . was filed second.” Id. at 940–41.
34. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972.
35. Id. at 973.
36. Id.
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“deter[ ] would-be relators from making overly broad allegations” that
would preclude future relators from bringing suit.37
C. The First and D.C. Circuits Have Declined to Incorporate Rule 9(b)
in the First-to-File Context
The D.C. Circuit has rejected the Sixth Circuit’s approach and held that
first-filed complaints need not satisfy Rule 9(b) in order to preclude laterfiled complaints under the first-to-file bar.38 In United States ex rel. Batiste v.
SLM Corp., the relator, a former senior loan associate at SLM Corporation’s
subsidiary, alleged that the defendant defrauded the government in administering student loans under the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(“FFELP”) by falsely certifying that the data submitted with its claims for
payment complied with federal law.39 Two years prior to Batiste’s filing,
however, Michael Zahara, another relator, had launched a qui tam action
against SLM in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
similarly alleging that the defendant had encouraged its employees to falsify
loan records regarding delinquent FFELP loans and had given bonuses to
employees granting forbearances on loans.40 Finding that Batiste’s complaint
“allege[d] the same essential wrongdoing by the same defendant” as the
Zahara complaint, the district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even though Zahara’s complaint admittedly had failed to satisfy Rule 9(b).41
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court on appeal, asserting that
“first-filed complaints need not meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b)
to bar later complaints; they must provide only sufficient notice for the government to initiate an investigation into the allegedly fraudulent activities,
should it choose to do so.”42 Accordingly, the court rejected Batiste’s argument that grafting a Rule 9(b) requirement onto the first-to-file bar would
provide adequate information for the government to launch an investigation
37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, the Sixth Circuit’s policy rationale
of deterring parasitic plaintiffs seems particularly baffling when the court immediately conceded that there was “no indication that the Brooks relator worded his complaint in excessively
general terms in order to preserve the lion’s share of any potential recovery for himself.” Id.
38. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
39. Id. at 1206. Batiste further alleged that SLM encouraged “loan officers to grant unlawful forbearances by giving bonuses to individuals who reduced delinquencies,” either by
“bringing borrowers current on their loans or granting them forbearances.” Id. at 1207.
40. Id.
41. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102, 104–05 (D.D.C.
2010), aff’d, 659 F.3d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “The Southern District of Indiana previously
dismissed Zahara’s complaint without prejudice after he was unable to obtain counsel by a set
deadline.” Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1207. Nonetheless, Batiste claimed that Zahara’s complaint was
not a “pending action” because of its supposed failure to comply with Rule 9(b). Batiste, 740 F.
Supp. 2d at 104. Unconvinced by this argument, the district court rejected Walburn’s “legally
infirm” rationale and concluded that, “once the whistle has sounded, the government has little
need for additional whistle-blowers.” Id.
42. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.
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and prohibit placeholder complaints from precluding more particularized,
later-filed complaints.43 The court further noted that imposing a heightened
pleading standard on FCA complaints “would create a strange judicial dynamic,” potentially requiring multiple district courts to disagree with each
other regarding a complaint’s sufficiency.44
Recently, the First Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in holding that a firstfiled complaint need not meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement in order
to provide sufficient notice to the government and preclude a later-filed
complaint.45 In United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., the
relator, a former account manager in Boston Scientific Corporation
(“BSC”)’s heart-failure management group, alleged that BSC defrauded the
government by launching a scheme to provide kickbacks to physicians, encouraging them to implant its cardiac-rhythm management devices and refer patients who could be implanted with these devices.46 About a year
earlier, however, Elaine Bennett had initiated a nearly identical qui tam suit,
which was still pending at the time Heineman-Guta filed her complaint.47
Similar to Heineman-Guta, Bennett, a former employee at BSC, alleged that
the defendant had engaged in a kickback scheme that coaxed hospitals and
physicians into using BSC’s devices, which led the physicians who received
kickbacks to submit to Medicare false claims for payment.48
Affirming the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the First Circuit ruled that “the question of whether allegations in a complaint have been
plead with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b) to withstand a defendant’s motion to dismiss is distinct from whether the allegations give the
government adequate notice of potential fraud to begin an investigation
under the first-to-file rule.”49 Therefore, even though her complaint contained numerous conclusory allegations and failed to allege the particulars
of the defendant’s kickback schemes, “there is no question that the Bennett
Complaint provided the essential facts of BSC’s alleged fraud” in order to
give the government adequate notice.50 The court further concluded that,
43. Id.
44. Id. Should Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard apply to the first-to-file bar, the
court in the forum of the later-filing relator may need to adjudicate the sufficiency of the firstfiled complaint pending in another forum “under a wide variety of procedural and substantive
requirements,” which would certainly bring about a host of administrative difficulties. Brief of
Appellee at 26, Batiste, 659 F.3d 1204 (No. 10-7140).
45. United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir.
2013).
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. at 30–32.
48. Id. at 31.
49. Id. at 36.
50. Id. at 37. The court additionally posited that the first-to-file bar did not require that
both complaints allege either particularized or identical facts but rather that they exhibit an
overlap in their material facts. Id.

568

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 113:559

“[o]nce the government is put on notice of its potential fraud claim, the
purpose behind allowing qui tam litigation is satisfied.”51
Although both the First and D.C. Circuits drew a distinction between
the FCA notice requirements for the government at the first-to-file stage and
for defendants at the pleading stage, the courts failed to provide a satisfactory explanation to account for this difference. Instead of advancing detailed
justifications as to why the government does not require the heightened notice of Rule 9(b), the courts summarily asserted that complaints deficient
under Rule 9(b) “may nonetheless provide the government sufficient notice
to begin an investigation of an alleged fraudulent scheme.”52 Thus, especially
when viewed in conjunction with the conclusory reasoning from the Sixth
Circuit,53 the circuit court opinions fail to offer a workable resolution of this
issue that derives support both from a textual analysis of the first-to-file
provision and Rule 9(b) and from the government’s fact-finding procedures
in FCA actions.54 Parts II and III address these deficiencies: Part II discusses
the text and intent of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b), and Part III
examines the government’s investigatory resources that supplement the four
corners of the relator’s complaint.
II. The Plain Language and Underlying Purposes of
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b)
Part II argues that neither the plain language nor the underlying purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b) suggests that a first-filed
complaint must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard in order to
preclude later-filed complaints. Section II.A examines the text and intent of
both § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b). This Section notes the conspicuous absence of any reference to Rule 9(b) in the first-to-file provision and discusses
the conflicting policy goals animating § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. Section II.B considers the problems inherent in the Sixth
Circuit’s “legally infirm” approach and concludes that the First and D.C.
Circuits’ distinction between the notice requirements to the government at
51. Id. at 38 (quoting Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1279 (10th
Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 36; United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“[A] complaint may provide the government sufficient information to launch an investigation of a fraudulent scheme even if the complaint does not meet the particularity standards
of Rule 9(b).”).
53. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
54. The D.C. Circuit offered only a cursory inspection of the text and purpose of the
first-to-file bar and Rule 9(b) and quickly dismissed the Sixth Circuit’s decision on the broad
policy grounds that the imposition of Rule 9(b) “would not minimize duplicative claims, [but]
would [instead] encourage opportunistic behavior.” Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1211 (quoting United
States ex rel. Folliard v. Synnex Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D.D.C. 2011)). Admittedly, the
First Circuit made significant inroads in discussing the statutory language and congressional
intent of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b). Guidant, 718 F.3d at 34–36. Nonetheless, the
First Circuit declined to provide an analysis of the governmental procedures involved in “initiat[ing] an investigation into allegedly fraudulent practices.” Id. at 37.
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the first-to-file stage and the notice requirements to the defendant at the
pleading stage honors both the language and intent of § 3730(b)(5) and
Rule 9(b).
A. The Text and Policy Goals of § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b)
An initial inquiry into the first-to-file rule’s meaning should begin with
the plain language of § 3730(b)(5).55 Indeed, “courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.”56 Nowhere does § 3730(b)(5) include any language even tacitly referring to Rule 9(b) or the incorporation of a particularity requirement into the
first-to-file rule.57 The failure to allude to Rule 9(b) or its heightened pleading standard surely forecloses the incorporation of the rule into
§ 3730(b)(5).58
Looking to the plain language of § 3730(b)(5), the D.C. Circuit concluded that the statute’s “command is simple: as long as a first-filed complaint remains pending, no related complaint may be filed.”59 This
straightforward approach should hardly seem controversial, particularly in
light of the numerous inferential leaps needed to insert Rule 9(b) into the
language of the first-to-file bar.60 The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, blithely
sailed past the plain text of § 3730(b)(5) and read Rule 9(b) into the first-tofile rule in light of the FCA’s “policy of encouraging whistleblowers to notify
the government of potential frauds.”61 Not only does this approach introduce erroneous language into the first-to-file rule but it also distorts the
balance in the FCA’s dual policy goals by easily allowing “would-be relators
[to] merely feed off a previous disclosure of fraud”62 and therefore failing to
deter parasitic plaintiffs. Indeed, under such an interpretation, “dozens of
55. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (“Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”).
56. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62 (2002) (quoting Conn. Nat’l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)). The Court goes on to hold that, “[w]hen the
words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is
complete.” Id. at 462 (quoting Germain, 503 U.S. at 253–54) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
57. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012).
58. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (refusing to add a word); Brief for Appellees at 41, Guidant, 718 F.3d 28 (No. 12-1867) (“Section 3730(b)(5)’s lack of any reference to a
‘particularity’ requirement precludes reading the statute to require one.”); see also infra notes
59–63 and accompanying text.
59. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.
60. See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 537 (“There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.”
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
61. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 970.
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relators could expect to share a recovery for the same conduct, decreasing
their incentive to bring a qui tam action in the first place.”63
Moreover, references to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abound
elsewhere in the FCA.64 The text of § 3730(b) twice incorporates Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) when outlining the service process for the relator’s complaint.65 Congress also expressly included the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in other provisions of the FCA.66 It is well settled that, “where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the deliberate inclusion of exclusion.”67
Thus, the repeated incorporation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
throughout the FCA, most noticeably in § 3730(b) itself, shows that Congress was perfectly capable of including Rule 9(b) in the first-to-file provision but elected not to do so.68
Moving beyond the plain language of the statute, the intent of the firstto-file provision conflicts with Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. In
passing the 1986 Amendments Act, Congress sought “to reconcile two conflicting goals, specifically, preventing opportunistic suits, on the one hand,
while encouraging citizens to act as whistleblowers, on the other.”69 To
achieve such a delicate balance, Congress “recognized the need for standards
to ensure that only truly deserving relators shared the Government’s recovery.”70 The first-to-file provision “reflects the strong congressional policy of
63. United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d
227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998). “By contrast, interpreting section 3730(b)(5) as imposing a broader
bar furthers the Act’s purpose by encouraging qui tam plaintiffs to report fraud promptly.” Id.
64. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2)–(3), 3732(a) (2012); see also Brief of Appellee,
supra note 44, at 23.
65. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (“A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); id. § 3730(b)(3)
(“The defendant shall not be required to respond to any complaint filed under this section
until 20 days after the complaint is unsealed and served upon the defendant pursuant to Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
66. E.g., id. § 3732(a) (“A summons as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
shall be issued by the appropriate district court” in an action brought under § 3730.); id.
§ 3733(b)(1)(B) (prohibiting discovery demands that are inconsistent with “the standards applicable to discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); id. § 3733(c)(2)
(providing that a civil investigative demand may be served on anyone outside of the United
States “in such manner as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe for service in a foreign country”); id. § 3733(h)(1) (permitting “the taking of testimony by any means authorized
by, and in a manner consistent with, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); id. § 3733(j)(6)
(“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to any petition under this subsection, to the
extent that such rules are not inconsistent with the provisions of this section.”).
67. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim
Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
68. Brief of Appellee, supra note 44, at 24.
69. United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d
227, 233 (3d Cir. 1998).
70. Anand, supra note 24, at 95.
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encouraging whistleblowers to come forward by rewarding the first to do
so.”71 This race to the courthouse among potential relators further facilitates
Congress’s goal of allowing the government to launch a timely investigation
into fraudulent activity and swiftly to recover stolen funds.72 In turn, by
enacting the first-to-file rule, Congress prioritized a “prompt disclosure of
fraud” over an extensive period of delay waiting for the ideal relator to come
forward with a perfectly pleaded complaint.73
Notably, the policy goals of the first-to-file bar share little, if any, relation with either the language or the purpose of Rule 9(b). In contrast to Rule
8, which “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’”74 Rule 9(b) demands that a party alleging fraud or mistake “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”75 Legislative
history regarding Rule 9(b) is virtually nonexistent, as both congressional
and American Bar Association hearings held at the time the Federal Rules
were adopted failed to discuss Rule 9(b) or the reasons behind its elevated
pleading standards.76 The Advisory Committee notes of 1937 indicate that
Rule 9(b) is drawn from the English Rules established in the Judicature Act,
where fraud could be used only as an affirmative defense in courts of equity.77 Accordingly, a party asserting fraud or mistake as a defense in a court
of law would have to raise it in a separate proceeding in a court of equity.78
The particularity requirement afforded protection to the prior judgment and
relieved judges from reopening settled actions.79
Given the merger of courts of law and equity, Rule 9(b) now merits
alternative justifications for its continued use in pleading.80 Chief among
Rule 9(b)’s current purposes “is to afford defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the factual ground upon which it is based.”81 Rule 9(b)’s

71. Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2005).
72. Lesley Ann Skillen & Megan M. Scheurer, Who’s on First: 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5),
False Claims Act & Qui Tam Q. Rev., Jan. 2007, at 67, 76.
73. Campbell, 421 F.3d at 821.
74. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Although Rule 9(b) permits the pleader to allege conditions of
mind “generally,” it must also be emphasized that “Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to
evade the less rigid—though still operative—strictures of Rule 8.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
76. Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike Rule 9(b), 38 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 281, 287 (2004).
77. Id. at 287.
78. Id. at 284.
79. Id. at 285.
80. Qian, supra note 13, at 614.
81. Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1990).
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particularity requirement also serves to “safeguard[ ] [the] defendant’s reputation and goodwill from improvident charges of wrongdoing” and “to inhibit the institution of strike suits.”82 This more demanding standard in turn
aims “to eliminate the filing of a conclusory complaint as a pretext for using
discovery to uncover wrongs.”83 Crucially, these primary justifications for
Rule 9(b) all revolve around protecting the defendant’s interests when the
plaintiff brings allegations of fraud at the pleading stage.
In light of the FCA’s status as one of the most potent antifraud statutes,
various circuit courts have applied Rule 9(b) with little fanfare to protect
defendants at the pleading stage in FCA actions.84 Indeed, even the Supreme
Court has indicated—without providing an extensive rationale—that FCA
complaints served on defendants must meet the requirements of Rule 9(b).85
Looking to the plain language of the FCA, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that
“[a] clear and unequivocal requirement that a relator allege specific false
claims emerges from the conjunction of Rule 9(b) and the statutory text of
the FCA.”86 Because § 3729(a)(1) prohibits only “a narrow species of fraudulent activity[,] ‘present[ing], or caus[ing] to be presented . . . a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval,’ ” the relator “must include an
averment that a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval has been
submitted to the government.”87 The Ninth Circuit has further justified this
interpretation on the grounds of protecting FCA defendants accused of
fraudulent activity.88 Thus, the imposition of Rule 9(b) on FCA complaints
to safeguard defendants at the pleading stage is decidedly consistent with
both the text and policy of Rule 9(b) and the FCA. Nonetheless, the application of Rule 9(b) at the first-to-file stage to provide notice to the government in FCA actions proves far more problematic.
82. Id.
83. A.I. Credit Corp. v. Hartford Computer Grp., Inc., 847 F. Supp. 588, 597 (N.D. Ill.
1994). Further, the court noted that “Rule 9(b) is not to be read blindly, but it is to be applied
in order to effectuate the purposes of the rule.” Id.; see also Inman v. Am. Paramount Fin., 517
F. App’x 744, 748 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 9(b) serves an important purpose in fraud actions
by alerting defendants to the precise misconduct with which they are charged and protecting
defendants against spurious charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior.” (quoting Brooks v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. See, e.g., Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); United States
ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997); Gold
v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476–77 (2d Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Cooper
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 568 (11th Cir. 1994).
85. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1898 (2011).
86. United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., 501 F.3d 493, 504 (6th Cir. 2007).
87. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640
(6th Cir. 2003)). Additionally, the court noted that “pleading an actual false claim with particularity is an indispensable element of a complaint that alleges an FCA violation.” Id.
88. Bly-Magee, 236 F.3d at 1018 (holding that “defendants accused of defrauding the
federal government have the same protections as defendants sued for fraud in other
contexts”).
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B. The Distinction Between Notice Requirements Under § 3730(b)(5)
and Under Rule 9(b)
Although the heightened notice requirements of Rule 9(b) comfortably
apply to shield the defendant at the pleading stage, they have no place in
§ 3730(b)(5).89 Rule 9(b)’s inclusion in § 3729(a) clearly serves to protect
the interests of the defendant in FCA litigation, and a discussion of the government’s interests with respect to Rule 9(b) is noticeably lacking.90 Unlike
§ 3729, which explicitly makes reference to the defendant’s fraudulent submissions and activity intended to “defraud the Government,”91 the first-tofile bar contains no mention of the requirements the relator must satisfy in
his complaint and expressly refers to the government’s interest in barring
later-filing relators.92 Consequently, the first-to-file bar focuses on the notice
to the government during its investigation period—notice that is certainly
less stringent than the exacting notice required for the defendant at the subsequent pleading stage.93 In declining to apply Rule 9(b) at the first-to-file
stage, the First and D.C. Circuits recognized this acute distinction.94
The Sixth Circuit’s treatment of first-filed complaints as “legally infirm”95 when they are deficient under Rule 9(b) forces an exception onto the
decidedly exception-free § 3730(b)(5) and significantly rewrites plain statutory language.96 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to promote later-filing
whistleblowers in no way serves the markedly prodefendant policy interests
advanced by Rule 9(b).97 In short, the language of § 3730(b)(5) is “plain and
simple: an action is barred if it is a ‘related action’ that is ‘based on the facts
underlying the pending action.’ ”98

89. See United States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 473 F. App’x 849, 851 (10th Cir.
2012) (“We admit to being uneasy with the parties’ suggestion that Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement should be applied to the first-to-file bar.”).
90. Section 3729(a) “imposes civil penalties and treble damages on persons who submit
false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States.” Schindler, 131 S. Ct. at 1890.
91. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
92. Id. § 3730(b)(5).
93. United States ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Ctr., Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d 825,
837 (E.D. Va. 2013) (noting that a complaint’s failure to satisfy Rule 9(b) does not preclude the
application of the first-to-file bar, because, at the first-to-file stage, “the Government needs
only notice of the fraud in order to conduct its own investigation”).
94. See supra Section I.C.
95. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005).
96. See United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir.
2013).
97. See id.
98. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012)); see also United States ex rel. LaCorte v.
SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 233 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[S]ection
3730(b)(5)’s plain language is conclusive; the statute speaks of a ‘related action,’ not an identical one. Thus we need not search the legislative history to determine the Congressional will.”).
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Additionally, the peril of Rule 9(b)’s more demanding review still looms
at the pleading stage, should the relator survive the first-to-file bar.99 If the
initial relator failed to allege the defendant’s fraudulent conduct with particularity, “he would lose his own shot at monetary reward. The threat of a
second application of Rule 9(b) is unnecessary.”100 In short, Rule 9(b)’s exacting review at the pleading stage “provides sufficient deterrence against
overly broad allegations.”101 The distinction between the requirements to
meet the first-to-file bar and the requirements to survive Rule 9(b) at the
pleading stage therefore better advances the language and intent of both
§ 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b).102 Furthermore, this distinction provides
straightforward guidelines to federal district courts instead of requiring
them to make arbitrary distinctions as to the meaning and application of
Rule 9(b) at various stages in the litigation.
III. The Government Has Sufficient Investigatory Resources
Beyond the Four Corners of the Complaint
to Assess Adequately the Merits of the
Relator’s Allegations
Although Part II’s discussion of the language and intent of 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b) cautions against the incorporation of Rule 9(b)
into the first-to-file provision, that discussion does not fully consider the
government’s notice requirements in FCA actions from a practical standpoint. Indeed, any analysis of the government’s notice demands at the firstto-file stage should examine the government’s relationship with the relator
and its fact-finding procedures during the period under seal. Part III addresses the government’s investigatory efforts in practice and contends that,
unlike defendants in civil fraud litigation, the government has a wide variety
of resources at its disposal outside of the complaint in evaluating prospective
FCA claims. Section III.A demonstrates that the relator himself serves as a
readily accessible resource for the government’s preliminary investigation.
Instead of operating as an adversary in the litigation, the relator functions as
99. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Moreover, even if Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement were relaxed on a motion to dismiss,
see, e.g., United States ex rel. Klein v. Empire Educ. Corp., 959 F. Supp. 2d 248, 257 (N.D.N.Y.
2013), the relator’s complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’ ” in order to satisfy Rule 8. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Given that courts cannot “credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its
factual context” to survive a less demanding Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, relators already
have adequate incentives to avoid proffering bare bones complaints filled with broad allegations. Id. at 1954; see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1, 88 (2010).
100. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1211.
101. LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 234. “Moreover, there is no indication that any of the original
plaintiffs in this case worded their complaints in excessively general terms for the purpose of
thwarting later claims.” Id.
102. See supra Section I.C.

February 2015]

Conflicting Requirements of Notice

575

a partner to the government in uncovering the defendant’s fraudulent conduct. Thus, Rule 9(b)’s purpose of providing heightened notice to an adverse
party proves inapplicable to the government in the context of FCA actions.
Section III.B describes the government’s extensive investigation into the
merits of the relator’s complaint during the period under seal. In its preliminary fact finding, the government goes beyond the four corners of the complaint and utilizes a variety of resources, including interviews and discovery
with the relator and relator’s counsel. Section III.C concludes that, on account of these multiple tools—which supplement the complaint itself—the
government will not decline to intervene in a meritorious suit simply because the relator’s complaint does not comply with Rule 9(b).
A. The Relator’s Function as a Resource to the Government
The government’s most conspicuous tool during its initial investigation
is the relator. Unlike a plaintiff asserting a common law fraud claim against a
defendant, the relator does not function as an adversary to the government
but rather as a helpful partner in uncovering and combating fraudulent conduct.103 The 1986 Amendments Act recognized that “a solid partnership needs to be forged between government prosecutors and private
whistleblowers and their counsel” to successfully prevent fraud against the
government.104 Indeed, informative whistleblowers have played a significant
role in the FCA’s success as a regulatory and prosecutorial tool.105 Governmental officials have in turn praised the efforts of insider relators and their
counsel, regarding them as “essential” assistants to the government in these
actions.106
In light of this cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between
the relator and the government, it seems incongruous to apply Rule 9(b),
which concerns adversarial relationships, to the first-to-file bar. Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirement exists “to provide adversaries with fair ‘notice of
the precise misconduct with which they are charged, and to safeguard defendants against spurious charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior.’ ”107
When a plaintiff alleges fraud in his complaint, he is hardly attempting to
aid the defendant in uncovering and combating the fraudulent conduct. Instead, he is attempting to provide the defendant with adequate notice of why
103. Thomas Grande, The False Claims Act: A Consumer’s Tool to Combat Fraud Against
the Government, 12 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 129, 134 (2000).
104. James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues,
Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1261, 1273 (2013).
105. See Pamela Bucy et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: A Study of Emerging State Efforts to
Combat White Collar Crime, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523, 1530 (2010) (“Insiders . . . can be
enormously helpful since fraud generally is complex, hidden within an organization, and concealed by false documentation.”).
106. Id.
107. Marks v. Struble, 347 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (D.N.J. 2004) (quoting Seville Indus.
Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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he is being sued and enable him to prepare a responsive pleading.108 In this
adversarial setting, both the defendant and the court view the prototypical
fraud claim through the lens of the plaintiff’s complaint.109 In the context of
the FCA, however, the government possesses multiple lenses through which
it can examine the merits of the relator’s claim. As both ally and informant
to the government, then, the relator surely renders Rule 9(b)’s heightened
notice requirements inapplicable to the government in the FCA setting.
Indeed, not only do relators serve as partners to the government but
they also provide information to the government beyond the four corners of
the complaint. As an initial matter, when filing the complaint under seal, the
relator must also prepare and serve the government with a “written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information [he] possesses.”110
The disclosure statement includes relevant “information, documents, damage theories, lists of witnesses, and the names of potential expert witnesses.”111 In turn, the written disclosure requirement provides information
supplemental to the complaint that significantly factors into the government’s choice of whether to intervene or move to dismiss the complaint
because of jurisdictional bars.112 Accordingly, the relator already provides the
government with additional facts to paint a more colorable picture of his
claim before the defendant even becomes involved in the lawsuit.113 In short,
a complaint’s deficiency under Rule 9(b) will not necessarily impede the
government’s ability to launch an investigation.
B. The Government’s Investigative Efforts During the Period Under Seal
The government certainly utilizes the relator’s collateral information in
its investigative efforts during the sixty-day period when the complaint remains under seal.114 Notably, Congress intended the initial period under seal
“to allow the Government an adequate opportunity to fully evaluate the private enforcement suit and determine both if that suit involves matters the
Government is already investigating and whether it is in the Government’s

108. See Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural
Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 457, 503
(1998).
109. Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly,
and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56 Vill. L. Rev. 857, 857–58 (2012).
110. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012).
111. Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Qui Tam Actions: Best Practices for Relator’s Counsel, 38 J.
Health L. 367, 377–78 (2005). The relator’s counsel includes this information “with an eye to
maximizing the government’s interest in the case.” Id. at 378.
112. Martie Ross & Jenny Brannon, False Claims Act and Qui Tam Litigation: The Government Giveth and the Government Taketh Away (And Then Some), J. Kan. B. Ass’n, Nov.–Dec.
1999, at 20, 32.
113. Id. at 32.
114. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
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interest to intervene and take over the civil action.”115 In practice, the government typically utilizes the investigative period to communicate and collaborate with the relator and relator’s counsel, often to the point of
“outsourcing.”116
Although ideally the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint would provide the government with an adequate basis to assess the merits of his claim
and make an intervention decision, counsel for the government has openly
recognized that such complaints seldom surface.117 Consequently, when
launching its investigation, the government uses the complaint as a springboard rather than as an exhaustive manual.118 Interviewing the relator is one
of the first steps in the government’s investigation process.119 During the
interview, at which the relator’s counsel is present, the government typically
attempts to “probe the motive and background of the relator as would be
done for any witness coming forward.”120 If the relator’s interview and the
disclosure of material evidence suggest the need for additional review, the
government may also conduct further discovery, including interviews with
relevant witnesses, a review of government records, and the issuance of a
subpoena for the defendant’s records.121 To be sure, the government has a
variety of tools that it can use prior to the discovery mechanisms of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the postfiling stage, such as civil investigative demands, Inspector General subpoenas, and grand jury materials.122
In sum, the relator’s complaint serves a markedly different purpose in
the context of an FCA claim than does a typical plaintiff’s complaint in the
context of a common law fraud claim. Unlike a defendant alleged to have
committed fraud, the government suffers no reputational damage from the
qui tam plaintiff’s allegations that would merit particularized pleading.123
On the contrary, the government itself has suffered as the defrauded party in
the litigation, and it does not require heightened factual details to prepare a
115. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 24 (1986).
116. Robert Fabrikant & Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims Act:
“Outsourcing” the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During the Seal Period, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 837, 837–38 (2007) (“It is also common knowledge that government
counsel routinely permit, indeed invite, whistleblower’s counsel to do much of the government’s investigative work during the seal period.”).
117. Kathleen McDermott, Qui Tam: An AUSA’s Perspective, False Claims Act & Qui
Tam Q. Rev., Oct. 1997, at 20, 24 (“It is a rare qui tam that comes with all the evidence
necessary to make an intervention decision.”).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 24. Further, DOJ performs the primary investigative role of assessing FCA
complaints because “the government . . . is in the best position to access necessary data and
move the investigation to a successful result.” Id. at 25.
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id. at 24–25.
122. Ross & Brannon, supra note 112, at 32.
123. See Fairman, supra note 76, at 292.
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defense to the plaintiff’s claim at the onset of litigation.124 Rather, the government pursues an extensive, synergistic effort before the complaint is even
unsealed and the formal litigation process begins.125 Given that the government frequently relies on efforts of the relator outside of the complaint, it
does not require the exacting scrutiny of Rule 9(b) in pursuing its
investigation.126
C. The Government Will Not Decline to Intervene in a Meritorious Suit
Simply Because the Relator’s Complaint Does Not Comply
with Rule 9(b)
A pleading deficiency in a meritorious case should not and will not automatically preclude the government from intervening in the action. As an
initial matter, it is in the relator’s best interest to provide as many factual
allegations as possible to support his claim, which would increase the likelihood that the government will intervene, successfully prosecute the action,
and apportion him a share of monetary damages.127 Indeed, “relators’ counsel already have a profound financial interest in ‘preparing a thorough, complete, and convincing written statement for the government’ ” to avoid the
risk of declination.128 Even if the relator has a meritorious claim and is unable to proffer a complaint that satisfies Rule 9(b), however, the government
still has investigative tools supplemental to the complaint that allow for a
proper assessment of the merits of the relator’s claim. Because the success of
the action will likely turn on the government’s intervention decision, “the
124. See Mark D. Robins, The Resurgence and Limits of the Demurrer, 27 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 637, 710–11 (1993); see also Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 38 (“There is no necessary reason why the same facts needed to protect defendants’ reputations from unjustified
fraud charges and give them sufficient notice to prepare a fraud defense must be the same facts
needed to give the government notice that an investigation may be merited.”).
125. See Fabrikant & Nwabuzor, supra note 116, at 837–38.
126. See id. at 844–45; Robins, supra note 124, at 710–11; see also Roberts v. Accenture,
LLP, 707 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that the FCA’s “primary purpose of . . .
encourag[ing and rewarding] whistleblowers to come forward with allegations of fraud . . . is
advanced when a relator files a complaint which ‘provides the government sufficient information to pursue an investigation’ into the allegedly fraudulent practices” (quoting United States
ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). Interpreting § 3730(d),
the Eighth Circuit recognized in Roberts that the “relators’ complaint and assistance in prosecuting the action” against the defendant resulted in the government’s successful investigation
of the defendant computer manufacturer’s defective pricing practices. 707 F.3d at 1019. As a
result of the relators’ assistance to the government outside of the initial complaint, the government ultimately reached a favorable settlement and “the relators’ action served its intended
purpose.” Id.
127. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False Claims
Act, 31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 603, 675–76 (2004); Jack E. Fernandez, Jr., Commentary, The False
Claims Act: What Every Employment Lawyer Must Know, Andrews Emp. Litig. Rep., Mar. 29,
2005, at 13, 15 (noting that “the greatest predictor of the success of any False Claims Act
lawsuit is whether the government chooses to intervene”).
128. Jonathan T. Brollier, Note, Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the Incentive
Structure of Qui Tam Actions Brought Under the False Claims Act, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 693, 711
(2006) (quoting Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2002)).
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relator’s strategy is to provide the government with the maximum amount
of assistance as possible during the seal period in the hope of convincing the
government to intervene.”129 Moreover, when determining the apportionment of the plaintiff’s recovery, the DOJ Relator’s Share Guidelines expressly
consider whether “[t]he relator provided substantial assistance during the
investigation and/or pretrial phases of the case.”130 Therefore, both the relator and the government share a mutual interest in cooperative fact finding
during the period under seal, with the understanding that the government’s
intervention decision will not turn solely on the facts alleged in the
complaint.131
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit’s assertion that a complaint deficient
under Rule 9(b) is rendered “legally infirm from its inception” seriously
misconstrues the government’s notice requirements in the FCA context.132
The Sixth Circuit expressed concern that “according preemptive effect to a
fatally-broad complaint [would not] further[ ] the policy of encouraging
whistleblowers to notify the government of potential frauds.”133 This approach surely echoes the Ninth Circuit’s fear that “an absolute first-to-file
rule would permit displacement of real whistleblowers by sham complaints.”134 The Sixth Circuit’s characterization of “fatally-broad” complaints, however, fails to consider the government’s investigative procedures
and the FCA’s policy goals of deterring parasitic plaintiffs. By enacting a
statute allowing the government to evaluate the merits of the complaint
before the defendant can raise Rule 9(b) objections, Congress clearly understood “that the government can possess the necessary information to investigate and proceed with the action regardless of the formalities of Rule
9(b).”135
Indeed, given the government’s considerable investigative efforts, counsel for the government hardly requires a complaint to allege the particularized “facts of a fraudulent scheme.”136 To the contrary, “it is highly unlikely
129. Fabrikant & Nwabuzor, supra note 116, at 852. The Government Accountability Office’s review of DOJ’s data “conclusively demonstrates that the relator is much better off if the
government intervenes.” Id. Indeed, “where the government does not intervene, and the relator has to go it alone, the median of settlements in non-intervened cases is less than ten
percent than in intervened cases.” Id.
130. Dep’t of Justice, Relator’s Share Guidelines 2 (1996), available at http://vsg-law
.com/VSG-Legal-Articles/doj_relator.pdf.
131. See id.; see also United States ex rel. Piacentile v. Sanofi Synthelabo, Inc., No. 05-civ2927, 2010 WL 5466043, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2010) (“After an extensive investigation of a
relator’s claim, the government is likely to have ample notice of the underlying facts, regardless
of whether the complaint is later dismissed.”).
132. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005).
133. Id. at 973.
134. Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2005).
135. Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 39; see also United States ex rel. Sandager v. Dell
Mktg., L.P., 872 F. Supp. 2d 801, 811 (D. Minn. 2012) (“The ultimate question is whether the
Government had a basis on which to investigate the fraudulent scheme. That standard may be
met even if the first-filed complaint is technically deficient.”).
136. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973.
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that prosecutors, the audience to which the qui tam notice is directed, would
fail to investigate just because a complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b).”137
Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s fear that a first-to-file relator with a placeholder
complaint would preclude subsequent relators alleging actionable conduct
appears unfounded. If the first relator has a meritless case, the government
will certainly make that assessment and elect not to intervene, leaving the
relator to prosecute the action alone, in which case his complaint will likely
be dismissed under Rule 9(b) or Rule 12(b)(6).138 If the first relator’s complaint is deficient under Rule 9(b) but alleges the same actionable conduct as
subsequent relators might allege, however, the government has supplemental
resources to make an informed decision as to the merits of the case in the
first instance.139
Admittedly, there is merit in the Sixth Circuit’s implicit acknowledgment that some relators stand in a much better position than others to assist
the government and proffer particularized complaints.140 For example, suppose two employees—Andrew, a compliance officer, and Charles, a receptionist—work at a partnership of physicians that has been submitting to
Medicare fraudulent claims for payment. Andrew, who collects records of
patient visits and billings, performs audits, and oversees the practice’s submissions to the government, would be ideally situated to plead the details of
the practice’s fraudulent scheme. Charles, by contrast, would have minimal,
if any, access to the physicians’ records and would in turn be unlikely to set
forth a complaint alleging the particularized facts needed to satisfy Rule
9(b). The Sixth Circuit’s nightmare involves a scenario where Charles, getting wind of Andrew’s soon-to-be-filed claim, quickly compiles a complaint
with only a basic sketch of the facts and subsequently precludes Andrew’s

137. Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. See, e.g., Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation
Under the Civil False Claims Act, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 813, 826 (2012) (“The immense disparity
between recoveries in qui tam actions in which the Government intervened and those in which
it did not suggests that most qui tam actions brought without government intervention assert
meritless or frivolous claims.”).
139. Notably, courts have frequently relaxed the procedural hurdle of Rule 9(b) in the
FCA context. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Klein v. Empire Educ. Corp., 959 F. Supp. 2d 248,
257 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (providing that a plaintiff-relator’s lack of access to relevant documents
“may trigger the relaxation of Rule 9(b)”); Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Comment, Reining in
Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied Certification Theory of Liability Under the False
Claims Act, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 227, 272 n.249 (2013). Further, even if the first relator’s initial
complaint is deficient under Rule 9(b), “the usual practice is to grant leave to amend the
complaint” in accordance with the liberal amendment policy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Klein, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 260. Therefore, should the government decline to intervene,
the first-filing relator would still have ample opportunity to cure any pleading deficiencies and
prosecute the action on his own. These procedural reprieves surely serve to eliminate concerns
that, in actionable cases, a first-filing relator proffering a conclusory complaint would unfairly
preclude subsequent relators on account of his inadequate pleading.
140. See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973.
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action, thus potentially promoting a policy of poor pleading among
relators.141
Even in this scenario, however, the limited factual allegations in
Charles’s first-filed complaint would not deprive the government of adequate notice of the partnership’s fraudulent conduct as a matter of course.
During the period under seal, the government would work closely with
Charles and his counsel and be able to discover the underlying facts of the
defendant’s scheme.142 Regardless of the complaint’s ability to satisfy Rule
9(b), the government would be able to initiate interviews with the relevant
players, including Andrew, and review the relevant documents, including the
fraudulent records to which Charles lacked easy access.143 Even if Andrew
provided a complaint that passed Rule 9(b) with flying colors, governmental
agents would follow a decidedly similar process of “reviewing boxes of documents, compiling and analyzing statistical data, interviewing witnesses,
and . . . speaking with experts to determine whether the case warrants federal intervention.”144 In sum, given the government’s considerable investigative efforts beyond the complaint, there is little reason to believe that
complaints that satisfy Rule 9(b)’s scrutiny are systematically better at providing notice to the government.
At first blush, this approach may seem unfair to Andrew and other relators who might be ideally situated to bring forward detailed complaints only
to be preempted in the race to the courthouse. Any fairness concerns of
precluding later-filing relators, however, fail to consider the plain statutory
command that qui tam actions “shall be brought in the name of the Government,” the true injured party, as opposed to compensating fully any relator
141. See id. (positing that Rule 9(b) can deter “would-be relators from making ‘overly
broad allegations’ that fail to adequately alert the government to possible fraud in an effort to
preclude future relators from sharing in any bounty eventually recovered” (quoting United
States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2003))).
142. See Pamela H. Bucy, Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act: Iterated Games and
Close-Knit Groups, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1021, 1040 (2004) (“[T]he expectations are that DOJ
attorneys will work closely with the relator and the defendant and their respective attorneys
early in the case.”); see also Memorandum, Dep’t of Justice, False Claims Act Cases: Government Intervention in Qui Tam (Whistleblower) Suits, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
pae/Civil_Division/InternetWhistleblower%20update.pdf (stating that “the Attorney General
(or a Department of Justice attorney) must investigate the allegations of violations of the False
Claims Act”). Furthermore, FCA practices contain several norms of behavior, including “the
expectation that relators’ counsel will bring only meritorious cases to the DOJ’s attention, will
warn DOJ attorneys if problems develop in the case, will be trustworthy and accurate in their
representations about the case, and will deliver on what they promise.” Bucy, supra, at 1039
(footnotes omitted).
143. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text; see also John T. Bentivoglio et al.,
False Claims Act Investigations: Time for a New Approach?, 3 Fin. Fraud L. Rep. 801, 806–07
(2011), available at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Publications2548_
0.pdf (recognizing that, while FCA matters in the past may have stagnated due to “a shortage
of government resources,” it is now common practice that “the government will continue to
initiate investigations and issue subpoenas, and to take action to keep investigations secret and
under seal for as long as possible”).
144. Caldwell, supra note 111, at 378.
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who may possess useful information.145 To be sure, “although qui tam actions allow individual citizens to initiate enforcement against wrongdoers
who cause injury to the public at large, the Government remains the
real party in interest in any such action.”146 Consequently, the relator has
“not personally suffered actual or threatened injury” but rather aids in the
prosecution of the FCA suit and receives a portion of the government’s recovery only upon prevailing.147
Moreover, an exception-free approach to the first-to-file bar that does
not incorporate Rule 9(b) more clearly aligns with the FCA’s policy goals of
promoting genuine whistleblowing and dissuading parasitic plaintiffs. In enacting the first-to-file provision, Congress desired to “spur the prompt reporting of fraud,” therefore placing a premium on the timeliest complaints
over the most detailed.148 Consequently, the first-to-file bar does not purport to allow the government “to intervene at its discretion in materially
similar fraud actions, but to protect the first-filed relator precisely in order
to incentivize private citizens to bring informative claims under the FCA.”149
Grafting Rule 9(b) onto the first-to-file provision, thereby instituting a ranking system among FCA complaints without regard to the time of filing,
would run contrary to the goals of the first-to-file bar and turn the race to
the courthouse “into a beauty contest between pleadings based on the same
underlying facts.”150 This approach would surely “weaken the incentive to
dig out the facts and launch the initial action” and would deter many relators from coming forward.151 In short, rewarding first-filing relators, even
those with complaints deficient under Rule 9(b), furthers the intent of the
first-to-file bar, while rewarding later-filing relators, even those with highly
detailed complaints, would seriously erode the bar.
Indeed, creating an exception to the first-to-file bar by incorporating
Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard disrupts the careful balance of the
FCA’s twin policy aims by encouraging duplicative and opportunistic litigation.152 Especially in close cases, subsequent relators could easily feed off
dismissed complaints and inundate multiple federal court dockets with similar complaints offering only a few additional factual allegations. Assuredly,
“dozens of relators could expect to share a recovery for the same conduct,
145. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012).
146. United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148,
1154 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 1153–54.
148. United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 377 (5th
Cir. 2009) (quoting United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc.,
149 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. United States ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech. Servs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43
(D.D.C. 2010).
150. Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 41.
151. United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp. Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 364 (7th
Cir. 2010).
152. Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 15.
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decreasing their incentive to bring a qui tam action in the first place.”153
Such an exception would severely undermine the first-to-file bar’s goals to
create a “race to the courthouse among eligible relators” and “spur the
prompt reporting of fraud.”154 Further, the imposition of Rule 9(b) would
certainly “create intra-judicial conflicts and practical difficulties.”155 Thus,
an exception-free approach to the first-to-file bar—one that does not incorporate Rule 9(b)—more closely adheres to the FCA’s goals of promptly alerting the government to fraudulent conduct and deterring duplicative
suits.156
Conclusion
Rule 9(b)’s exacting requirements of notice pleading have no place in
the FCA’s first-to-file bar. Neither the plain language nor the intent of 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) and Rule 9(b) indicates that first-filed complaints must
pass the scrutiny of Rule 9(b). Indeed, the notice requirements of defendants
in commonplace civil litigation differ markedly from those of the government in the FCA context. Unlike common law fraud defendants who face
plaintiffs in an adversarial setting and require heightened notice to shield
their reputations and prepare defense strategies, the government facilitates a
partnership with FCA plaintiffs and uses a host of investigatory tools supplemental to the complaint to assess plaintiffs’ allegations. Although the failure
of fraud plaintiffs to plead with particularity could have detrimental effects
for defendants, FCA plaintiffs’ failure to meet Rule 9(b) would surely not
preclude the government from intervening in actionable suits. Thus, FCA
complaints need not satisfy Rule 9(b) in order to provide the government
with sufficient notice. Moreover, this exception-free approach to the first-tofile bar aligns with the FCA’s goals of promptly alerting the government to
fraudulent conduct and deterring duplicative suits. Accordingly, courts
should ultimately adopt the approach employed by the First and D.C. Circuits in declining to incorporate Rule 9(b) into the first-to-file bar and consequently affording preclusive effect to first-filed complaints deficient under
Rule 9(b).

153. United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d
227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998).
154. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1176
n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 15.
156. Long, supra note 11, at 161–63.
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